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Business has become, in the last half century, the 
most powerful institution on the planet. The domi-
nant institution in any society needs to take re-
sponsibility for the whole...  
Every decision that is made, every action that is 
taken, must be viewed in light of that responsibility. 
 
(from David C. Korten, Limits to the Social Responsibility of Business, The People-Centered 
Development forum, article 19, release date: June 1, 1996.) 
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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the effects of socially responsible behavior of compa-
nies on their stock returns. First, I present a short overview of academic 
literature on the topic and discuss pro’s and con’s. Furthermore I point out 
the long-term perspective in Corporate Social Responsibility for corpora-
tions. With a certain screening methodology and data from Kinder Ly-
denberg Domini (KLD), I divide all companies in the S&P 500 index into 
deciles (from the most to the least socially responsible). Comparing their 
weekly average returns I cannot find a positive correlation between social 
and financial performance. To test if CSR-rankings can be used to explain 
stock returns I run several regressions. However, I cannot prove the hypo-
thesis that CSR is an explaining variable for stock returns (like e.g. market 
beta) in a statistically significant way. I argue, however, that a sustainable 
way of running a business will indeed, in the long-run, lead to a superior 
financial performance and hence to a better stock return. This argumenta-
tion can also be found in various academic papers, which are subsequent-
ly presented.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Let me give a brief explanation why I wanted to look at the topic of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility and its implications on stock returns.  
One of the main reasons is that the capital shift from the public to the pri-
vate sector (privatizations) in the last decades has not been reflected in a 
more socially responsible behavior of the majority of corporations. In the 
early decades of the century, most of today’s social nets in Europe were 
created by state governments in order to build a social economy. The gov-
ernment was a major employer for the population and therefore took care 
of it by financing social measures in order to protect people from extreme 
poverty. During the last decades of the 20th century, most state-run com-
panies were privatized. Nowadays, the world’s largest 200 private com-
panies account for more than a quarter of the world’s economic activity1. 
The social security of the people though, was continuing to be an issue for 
the state, without holding private companies accountable for any social 
responsibilities.  
With the large wave of privatizations, social economies all over the world 
are more and more getting into the troubles of financing this social net. 
Examples can be found all over the western world in health care organiza-
tions and state pension systems (the most extreme case is Europe with its 
                                                 
1 Lawrence et al. (2005, 47) 
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large social benefit programs). This development must lead to the conclu-
sion that corporations in future have to do more for the well-being of the 
society as a whole in order to be accepted by it. In a recent survey con-
ducted by McKinsey, a consultancy, CEOs think that society nowadays 
has higher expectations of business taking on public responsibilities than 
it did five years ago.2 That’s one of the reasons CSR is becoming such an 
important topic in doing business around the world.  
 
1.2 Context of the thesis 
Many papers have looked at the correlation between corporate social per-
formance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) and most of 
them show a positive correlation.3 Nevertheless this thesis does not look at 
financial performance of companies in a strict accounting context but ra-
ther on their stock return, both of which of course will be correlated 
though are still not the same, taking into account other factors that moti-
vate investors to invest in a certain company. Taking data from the S&P 
500 Index this work is going to compare the stock return of high-CSP 
companies with the return of low-CSP companies in order to find a signif-
icant correlation between these two factors. 
 
                                                 
2 Just good business, The Economist, Volume 386, Number 8563 (2008) 
3 See Preston, O’Bannon (1997, 419-429) 
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It is important to note, however, that data measuring the “amount” of 
corporate social responsibility has not been readily available for a long pe-
riod of time. Most of the companies started to think about and promote 
CSR only in the late 1990s and the first analyst firms started to measure 
the socially responsible behavior of companies only then. Therefore, the 
ranking of companies by their social behavior has not been done for more 
than 10 years, which leaves academia with the problem of trying to identi-
fy a long-term performance driver such as CSR with data that is not avail-
able for a long-enough time horizon. In the case of this thesis, I use CSR 
scorings from KLD, an analyst firm that specializes on CSR-research and 
provides a scoring methodology for publicly listed companies in the Unit-
ed States since the 1990s4. My dataset begins with scoring results for 2002 
and ends in the year 2006. With 5 years of scoring data, however, one can-
not identify long-term trends in a company’s stock, but rather mid-term 
effects. I hypothesize that using datasets containing 30 years of scoring da-
ta or more, the positive effects of sustainable and socially responsible 
business behavior could be shown much more clearly and significantly. 
However, this kind of data is not available. 
 
The following parts of the thesis are structured as follows: 
In section 2, I give a short introduction into the concept of Socially Re-
sponsible Investing (SRI) and explain how it evolved over time, in order to 
make clear the link between a socially responsible business behavior of a 
                                                 
4 See Appendix B for details on KLD and its screening methodology 
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company, its stock return and the investment patterns of investors trying 
to make use of this behavior. Afterwards, in section 2.3 I try to give a more 
precise explanation of the terms Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
and Corporate Citizenship, as these are the concepts that KLD as an ana-
lyst firm tries to identify and measure. We see that there are many differ-
ent definitions of CSR and I will therefore also describe how CSR devel-
oped over time. 
In section 3 the thesis argues that CSR can only be seen as a long-term per-
formance driver and embeds the following analysis of stock returns in sec-
tion 4 into a set of similar research throughout academic literature. As 
mentioned above, section 4 provides a detailed description of the per-
formed data analysis, which includes the comparison of average returns 
by ranked CSR-performance deciles and a Fama-Macbeth regression with 
a CSR factor-mimicking portfolio. 
Section 5 finally concludes the findings and discusses possible alternatives 
for future research on this topic. 
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2 Socially Responsible Investing and the 
concept of CSR 
2.1 Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) 
Throughout the literature many definitions of socially responsible invest-
ing can be found. In the following section I would like to give some exam-
ples and would like to define what I understand under SRI in this thesis. 
Moreover I want to show the link between SRI, Corporate Citizenship and 
CSR. 
Kinder (2005) describes SRI in the following way: 
“Socially responsible investing” is the incorporation of the investor’s social or 
ethical criteria in the investment decision-making process.5 
In 2005, the global Asset Management department of ABN-Amro, a large 
investment bank, came up with the following definition for SRI: 
An investment process in which sustainability criteria relating to a company’s 
social and/or environmental behavior play a decisive role in the admittance of that 
company’s stocks to the investment portfolio.6 
In 2005 a World Economic Forum report suggested this: 
Responsible investing is most commonly understood to mean investing in a man-
ner that takes into account the impact of investments on wider society and the 
natural environment, both today and in the future.7 
                                                 
5 Kinder (2005, 4) 
6 ABN-Amro (2005, 3) 
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The differences between and among these definitions reflect SRI’s expan-
sion. New types of investors have brought new perspectives.8 
 
Over the past 100 years, investment has taken on a passive character. It 
has become a mere financial transaction, like buying a certificate of depo-
sit. SRI restores something of the former meaning of the term by affirming 
the investor’s commitment to the company. In today’s economy, that as-
sertion takes on a crucial significance.9 
SRI evolved out of the wish to actively influence investment decisions and 
started in some form in the 1950s. Formally, screened portfolio investing 
was first introduced in the early 1970s with the Pax World Fund10. Since 
then, SRI grew rapidly to what is today a multi-trillion dollar phenome-
non.  
The “2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United 
States” reveals that the value of socially screened portfolios now exceeds 
$2 trillion. This represents a 240% growth since 1995, 40% faster than all 
professionally managed assets. The report identifies 200 ethical mutual 
funds in operation in 2003 compared to 55 in 1995. This development 
                                                                                                                                     
7 The World Economic Forum, Mainstreaming Responsible Investment. (2002, 7), cited in 
Kinder (2005, 4) 
8 Kinder (2005, 4) 
9 Kinder (2005, 6) 
10 Kinder (2005, 8) 
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alone shows that SRI is a topic that will be of even larger importance in 
the future.11 
SRI is not just popular with private investors. Particularly large institu-
tions like pension funds have started to invest in SRI Funds. These institu-
tions are especially keen to invest in socially responsible companies be-
cause they are subject to public control on their investment strategies and 
don’t want to end up investing heavily in arms, alcohol or tobacco – in 
short “sin” stocks. 
Therefore the SRI Fund industry is growing very fast and is becoming 
more and more popular every day. For this reason in this work I want to 
take a closer look at Socially Responsible Investing and would like to in-
vestigate if a “social” behavior of a company does have a statistically rele-
vant positive impact on its share price. If this is the case that would be a 
clear incentive for firms all over the world to rethink their position as 
“Corporate Citizens” and to do business in a holistic and sustainable way. 
As Chami et al. (2002) point out: “Ethical behavior can certainly be costly, 
but the consequences of ignoring ethics are costlier still, in terms of fore-
gone opportunities as well as economic inefficiency “ 
 
Kinder (2005) states in his paper on SRI, that the different terms SRI and 
CSR may lead to confusion because people might assume that socially re-
sponsible investors buy only shares in socially responsible companies. 
Few people think that a socially responsible company is conceivable. So, 
                                                 
11 See Boutin-Dufresne, Savaria (2004) 
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investment universes limited to socially responsible companies are quite 
rare. Therefore investors try to find securities, whose issuers do not fall 
below the investor’s minimum standards for ethical behavior. Those stan-
dards will differ from one investor to the next and some have criticized 
Socially Responsible Investing for its lack of uniform standards. What is 
socially responsible in today’s globalized world? 
 
The question what socially responsible behavior of firms looks like in real-
ity is quite complex. It can be understood in multiple ways. To avoid con-
fusion, for this work I define a socially responsible behavior of companies 
by stating that a corporation must use its ownership of assets to reflect the 
best interests of people. This stakeholder-approach is consistent with the 
definition of corporate accountability in the 1940s.12 A company is accoun-
table for all its decisions within its environment – from the correct treat-
ment of employees to making sure that its supply-chain businesses are al-
so run fairly and sustainable. 
However, in the next section I will take a glance at the evolution of SRI. 
Later in this thesis I will discuss the criteria for a company to be labeled 
“socially responsible” in my screening procedure of the S&P 500 in further 
detail. 
 
                                                 
12 See Kinder (2005, 17) 
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2.2 The development of Socially Responsible Investing13 
SRI began in the late 1960s in the US and Canada as what Kinder in his 
paper calls a “values-based” approach. It tried to align an investor’s port-
folio holdings with his/her beliefs. Values-based investors came to SRI be-
cause they wanted consistency, alignment between their principles and 
their investments. Alongside of it and based on the same values devel-
oped shareholder activism or engagement. 
By the late 1990s however, SRI had developed a second distinct approach 
which Kinder terms “value-seeking”. It seeks to identify social and envi-
ronmental criteria which may affect financial performance and therefore 
share price. Investors don’t necessarily try to be ethical in the selection of 
the companies they invest in – the value-seeking investor simply tries to 
identify why companies which align themselves with ethical / social / en-
vironmental issues are more successful than companies that don’t and 
which non-financial screens have predictive value for stock performance. 
The third approach to SRI is value-enhancing and is quite different from 
the values-based and value-seeking approaches in one regard: The value-
enhancing investor tries to exert influence on the business directly 
through his/her ownership (shareholder activism). This kind of investor 
uses his/her potential to affect corporate policy for the good. 
All three types or evolution stages of SRI have one factor in common: the 
fact that investment is more than just buying stock in a company. It is the 
                                                 
13 See Kinder (2005) for a very detailed overview 
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wish to use money in the best possible way and to ensure a sustainable 
behavior of corporations. 
Although Kinder has a point in saying that socially responsible investors 
fall into these different categories, most people will have a common idea 
about SRI. Having read many articles in newspapers, journals, etc. and 
having talked with a lot of people about their views and opinions on SRI. I 
discovered that socially responsible investing is mainly seen by people as 
what Kinder calls the value-enhancing SRI. For many investors it is not 
sufficient any more just to buy any stock to earn money, many investors 
nowadays care about how the specific company uses this money. The in-
vestor will be more willing to invest in a firm that abides by certain 
“rules”, namely corporate social responsibility guidelines. For instance, 
Heinkel et al. (2001) show that 20% of fund investors would be necessary 
to create an incentive for polluting firms to reform their factories to make 
them “green”. This is because above this 20% level of green investors, the 
cost of capital for a polluting company rises because its stock is bought 
only by less than 80% of fund investors.14 In the year the paper was pub-
lished, the percentage of green investors was nearly 10% and rising. I as-
sume a similar effect for the rest of the SRI community. If there are more 
and more investors around the world that include SRI criteria into their 
investment decision, there will soon be enough capital invested in socially 
responsible companies in order to create an incentive for other corpora-
tions to do business in a more socially responsible and sustainable way. 
                                                 
14 See also Von Arx (2005) who builds on the paper of Heinkel et al. (2002) 
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What I want to point out clearly however, is that I assume the investor to 
have a utility function that maximizes a combination of wealth and social 
good. Adding a non-wealth criterion to the investment decision of an in-
vestor of course comes with a cost. This cost to socially responsible invest-
ing is also associated with a constrained optimization of the investment 
set where the constrained efficient frontier lies on the interior or tangent to 
the unconstrained frontier15. 
 
Another important point I want to mention is, that there is no one guide-
line book which summarizes all the “socially responsible behavior-rules”. 
Every company and every single investor will have his own set of rules, 
his own ethical principles according to which he will invest in certain 
stocks and not in others.16 For some investors for instance, environmental 
care will be the biggest concern, whereas for others, human rights and the 
abortion of child labor will have top priority. As a result, socially respon-
sible indices differ in the emphasis they place on social characteristics, too. 
For example the DS 400 Index is the strongest among all indices on the 
environment while the Calvert Index is strongest on Corporate Gover-
nance.17  
 
In the literature there are many discussions if general guidelines of “how 
to do good business” should exist or not. The evolution of Corporate Go-
                                                 
15 Anderson, Myers (2006, 4) 
16 See Barracchini (2004) for a detailed discussion of an investors’ ethical choices 
17 Statman (2005) 
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vernance codes leads into this direction and CG is already becoming a 
standard in the legislation of western economies. However, Corporate 
Governance rules do not go far enough for socially responsible investors. 
They are meant to represent a certain minimum standard of business be-
havior and are therefore also published as corporate law. Some companies 
might, however, want to go further and take truly socially responsible de-
cisions in their businesses. 
In my opinion, the free will of companies to abide by certain socially re-
sponsible guidelines is an important factor when discussing general rules 
for business. Moreover, if the behavior of companies is being judged by 
their customers and by investors, I doubt that many companies can afford 
to stay low Corporate Social Performers. 
 
In the coming section of the thesis I will look in more detail into how a 
company is expected to behave in order to get the label of “SRI”-
compatibility. Therefore I present the scope and history of Corporate So-
cial Responsibility (CSR), which nowadays is a broadly discussed issue in 
every company around the world. 
 
2.3 A definition of CSR and Corporate Citizenship 
Proponents of SRI typically argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
represents management’s long-term views on how a company should per-
form, which may be mispriced due to ‘short-term thinking’ within the fi-
 15
nancial community. This stream of thought suggests SRI can be incremen-
tally profitable over long-run horizons.18  
In another sense, Corporate Social Responsibility means that a corporation 
should be held accountable for any of its actions that affect people, their 
communities, and their environment. It implies that harm to people and 
society should be acknowledged and corrected if at all possible19. This de-
finition of CSR is quite broad and has many different possibilities of inter-
preting it. Nevertheless it conveys the important message that CSR is not 
all about philanthropy but about a sustainable way of doing business. This 
fact is of utmost importance considering the fact that I want to study the 
effects of CSR on stock performance. It suggests that operating your busi-
ness in the most sustainable way will ensure long-term profits of the com-
pany and will therefore be visible in the stock price. 
However, being socially responsible must not mean that a company aban-
dons its other missions. Following the theory of Lawrence et al. (2005), a 
business has many responsibilities: economic, legal, and social. The chal-
lenge for the management of a company is the blending of these responsi-
bilities into a comprehensive corporate strategy. Only if a corporation 
achieves to succeed in all three areas can it call itself effectively success-
ful.20 
Whereas corporate social responsibility focuses more on the care of the 
public’s resources and on doing good for the society as a whole, the idea 
                                                 
18 Derwall et al. (2004, 3) 
19 Lawrence et al. (2005, 46) 
20 See Lawrence et al.(2005, 46) 
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of Corporate Citizenship focuses more on a responsible behavior towards 
the stakeholder of a company. Corporate Citizenship involves proactively 
addressing business and society issues, building stakeholder partnerships, 
discovering business opportunities through social strategic goals, and 
transforming a concern for financial performance into a vision of corpo-
rate financial and social performance21. In short it could be described with 
sustainability in all the company’s actions and the building of long-term 
partnerships with its stakeholders.  
In practice, the differences in the notion of CSR and Corporate Citizenship 
are often ambiguous. Therefore in this work I will not distinguish sharply 
between the two concepts and will use the term CSR from here onwards. 
 
2.4 The History of CSR 
The idea of corporate social responsibility first appeared in the United 
States at the beginning of the 20th century. Corporations were growing 
too big, too powerful and guilty of antisocial and anticompetitive practices 
and a lot of laws emerged at that period (antitrust, banking, consumer-
protection). A few farsighted business executives decided to use the pow-
er of their corporations voluntarily for broad social purposes. Examples of 
those business leaders are Andrew Carnegie or Henry Ford, who became 
great philanthropists and gave a lot of their wealth to educational and 
charitable institutions and started to develop and introduce programs to 
                                                 
21 Lawrence et al. (2005, 64) 
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support the recreational and health needs of their employees22. These 
leaders believed that their business had a responsibility to society that 
went beyond or worked in parallel with their efforts to make profits.23 
 
This belief is still the core of the CSR spirit nowadays. Running businesses 
effectively and profitably is crucial for any society. Corporations employ 
people, pay taxes to finance the social systems in a country, grow the 
overall economy and create new technology, which benefits the whole so-
ciety. By doing all that, corporations play an essential part in our society 
and are already taking a lot of responsibility. The modern idea of CSR is to 
extend this responsibility even further until a point where companies are 
responsible for all their stakeholder in a holistic and sustainable way. 
“Doing well by doing good” has become a fashionable mantra24. 
 
To get a better understanding of how CSR evolved throughout time let’s 
look at the last decades. Until the late 70s, CSR was derided as a joke, an 
oxymoron, and a contradiction in terms by the investment and business 
community25. 
                                                 
22The development of health-care programs for their employees could be seen as one of 
the first moves into the direction of Corporate Citizenship. The term CC itself was only 
used many years later. 
23 See Lawrence et al. (2005, 48) 
24 Just good business, The Economist, Volume 386, Number 8563 (2008) 
25 Lydenberg (2005) cited in Lee (2006, 2) 
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However, by the late 90s, CSR became almost universally sanctioned and 
promoted by all constituents in society from governments and corpora-
tions to non-governmental organizations and individual consumers. Most 
of the major international organizations such as United Nations, World 
Bank, Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development and In-
ternational Labor Organization not only endorse CSR, but have also estab-
lished guidelines and permanently staffed divisions to research and pro-
mote CSR26. Also, in the late 90s, almost 90% of the Fortune 500 companies 
embraced CSR in their annual reports to be an important element of their 
corporate strategy. 
 
This change in attitude of companies was not so much due to a more so-
cial society nowadays but rather to a different perception of CSR itself. 
When Henry Ford in 1917 stood in a courtroom defending his decision not 
to distribute the accumulated profits of his company to shareholders but 
rather to slash prices of T Model vehicles, he defined business in the fol-
lowing way: “To do as much as possible for everybody concerned, to 
make money and use it, give employment, and send out the car where the 
people can use it... and incidentally to make money.... Business is a service 
not a bonanza”27. 
Fords idea of business as a service was derided by shareholders and also 
by the court which ruled in 1919 that the maximum dividend had to be 
paid to shareholders. 
                                                 
26 Lee (2006, 2) 
27 Lee (2006, 3) 
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Lee (2006) shows however, that in 1999, 80 years later, Henry Ford’s great-
grandson, William Clay Ford Jr. took the helm of the company and tried 
again to convince his company's stakeholders of the importance of busi-
ness as a service to society: ''We want to find ingenious new ways to de-
light consumers, provide superior returns to shareholders and make the 
world a better place for us all”28. This time around, however, the younger 
Ford not only faced no lawsuits, but also received considerable support 
from various stakeholders of the company including shareholders. 
Why have the reactions of stakeholders been so different in 1919 and 1999? 
The major reason is that at the beginning of the 20th century the concept 
of social responsibility of a corporation was completely separated from its 
financial performance. However, nowadays society is beginning to accept 
the idea that CSR and therefore a sustainable way of doing business could 
indeed produce financial performance and secure the existence of the cor-
poration in the long-run. The difference in shareholders’ attitude regard-
ing CSR is therefore the change in their perception of the relationship be-
tween CSR and bottom-line performance of the organization.29 
 
The chapters to come are structured in the following way: in chapter 3, I 
will point out in more detail the transition of the CSR definition from a 
purely philanthropic to a holistic and integrated one, in order to explain 
nowadays’ underlying theory of Corporate Social Responsibility and Cor-
porate Citizenship as a way for companies to thrive and to ensure long-
                                                 
28 Lee(2006, 3) 
29 Lee (2006, 4) 
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term financial stability and performance. Moreover I will present existing 
research that has been done on the topic of financial performance vs. so-
cial performance. In section 4 I will describe the data I used to screen so-
cially responsible companies in the S&P 500 and present the performance 
of my socially screened portfolio against various benchmarks. In Section 5 
I will then conclude my findings and discuss possible ways of how the re-
search in this field should be extended. 
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3 Social Responsibility as a long-term per-
formance driver 
The question that the financial community has been dealing with for 
many decades is: Do the benefits of CSR outweigh its costs? Many aca-
demics tried to find an answer to this question and have come up with a 
lot of different results. As Griffin and Mahon (1997, 5) put it, the result is 
“25 years of incomparable research”. The main problem analyzing the link 
between CSR and financial performance is the CSR part. There are hun-
dreds of opinions on how the social behavior of corporations can be 
measured and if it can be measured at all.30 Nevertheless in the following, 
I will shortly present an overview on academic research in this field. 
 
3.1 How to measure Corporate Social Responsibility 
In order to be able to analyze a possible relationship between social and 
financial performance the first issue is to measure social performance ac-
curately. However, there is a lack of consensus throughout academic lite-
rature on which methodology is best suitable to measure Corporate Social 
Responsibility31. In many cases, indicators that are rather subjective, such 
as surveys from business students or business faculty members, are used 
to rank companies according to their corporate social performance (CSP). 
                                                 
30 See Entine (2003) 
31 See Tsoutsoura (2004) 
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In other cases, researchers use official corporate disclosures, such as an-
nual reports or CSR reports. These data sources are, in a way, subjective as 
well, as there is no way to determine if companies under-report or over-
report their social performance and only very few corporations have their 
CSR reports verified by external auditors.  
The problem of accurately measuring Corporate Social Responsibility is 
one of the reasons why data linking social and financial performance is 
not readily available in the literature over longer time-horizons. In this 
thesis, I use data from an analyst company named Kinder Lydenberg Do-
mini (KLD), which has one of the largest databases on corporate social 
performance of over 2000 US publicly listed companies. “KLD uses a 
combination of surveys: financial statements, articles on companies in the 
popular press, academic journals (especially law journals), and govern-
ment reports in order to assess CSP along eleven dimensions. Based on 
this information, KLD constructed the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400), 
the functional equivalent of the Standard and Poors 500 Index, for socially 
responsible firms.”.32 More details on the KLD screening procedure and on 
the used dimensions can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Another controversy is how to measure financial performance correctly. 
Financial performance is definitely easier to measure than social perfor-
mance, however, there is little consensus about which measure to apply. 
Some research uses accounting data provided by companies, others use 
                                                 
32 Tsoutsoura (2004, 10) 
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stock performance to find a link between CSP and financial performance. 
In this thesis I use stock returns to measure financial performance. One of 
the reasons I use this approach is that the stock price does not only reflect 
past financial performance (as accounting instruments do) but also reflects 
future potential performance which the investors attribute to a company. 
Therefore I argue that stock returns are better suitable to measure the 
long-term effect of Corporate Social Responsibility, also capturing the im-
age-effects of CSR. 
 
3.2 Social screening throughout the literature 
The academic literature on this topic has analyzed socially responsible in-
vesting in both equity and bonds.33 Angel and Rivoli (1997) found that 
“the reluctance of investors to invest in certain stocks can lead to an in-
crease in these companies’ cost of equity. However, there are a large pro-
portion of investors needed unwilling to invest in certain companies for 
the effect to be significant.” As mentioned in the introduction, research of 
Heinkel et al. (2001) leads to the same conclusion. If more people become 
SRI investors, companies not abiding by certain social standards will have 
a significantly higher cost of equity. Heinkel et al. (2001) also show that 
the percentage of SRI investors (in their special case “green investors”) is 
growing rapidly. 
 
                                                 
33 Anderson, Myers (2006) 
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Research within the area of investing has led to inconclusive results. In 
general the vast majority of research finds that SRI stocks do not under-
perform the market. However, there are of course costs of diversification 
and information effects.34 Guerard (1997) finds that returns for a socially 
screened universe do not differ significantly from an unscreened universe. 
Nevertheless, using multiple screens improves results. Jennings and Mar-
tin (2006) also report advantages using multiple screening techniques. 
They propose using factor-based models in SRI-screened investment un-
iverses to create “socially enhanced indexing”. Using commercial software 
and readily available portfolio screens, socially enhanced indexing offers 
mass customization of values based investment programs in an easy and 
cheap form and does indeed lead to outperformance. 
 
Combining modern portfolio and stakeholder theories, Barnett and Salo-
mon (2005) hypothesize that “the financial loss borne by an SRI fund due 
to poor diversification is offset as social screening intensifies because bet-
ter managed and more stable firms are selected into its portfolio.” They 
find support for this hypothesis through an empirical test on a panel of 61 
SRI funds from 1972-2000. The results show that as the number of social 
screens used by an SRI fund increases, financial returns decline at first, but 
then rebound as the number of screens reaches a maximum. That is, they 
find “a curvilinear relationship, suggesting that two long competing 
viewpoints may be complementary.”35 
                                                 
34 See Kurtz (1997) 
35 Barnett, Salomon (2005, 4) 
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Statman (2000) shows that socially responsible mutual funds did better 
than conventional funds. However, like in almost every other paper on 
this topic, the results are not statistically significant.  
Schröder (2003 and 2005) looks at the performance of SRI indices in con-
trast to SRI funds. This has the advantage that the transaction costs of 
funds, the market-timing activities and the skill of the fund manager can-
not distort the data, which “leads to a relatively direct measure of the per-
formance effects of SRI screens”36. However, Schröder cannot find a risk-
adjusted outperformance of SRI indices over their respective benchmarks 
either. 
 
One interesting paper from Tsoutsoura (2004) does not take stock returns 
as a proxy to measure financial performance but rather accounting data. 
In her study, “firm financial performance is measured by accounting va-
riables. The financial data used are return on assets (ROA), return on equi-
ty (ROE), and return on sales (ROS). The survey covers the firms included 
in the S&P 500 index for the years 1996 - 2000.”37 Using KLD data to 
measure the social performance, the study finds a positive relationship 
between CSP and financial performance, which is statistically significant. 
 
We shall see later in this thesis that with my screened stock portfolio I 
cannot find a statistically significant difference to unscreened portfolios. 
                                                 
36 Schröder (2003, 5) 
37 Tsoutsoura (2004, 12) 
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3.3 The long-term effect of CSR on stock prices 
Economic theory tells us that companies around the world seek to maxim-
ize their profits; “they will engage in whatever activity they believe will 
earn them the highest financial return.”38 The merit of an activity is there-
fore only judged by the company by its financial reward. As a conse-
quence, if “being good” or socially responsible turns out to be more prof-
itable than being “bad” the corporation has a real incentive to do “good”.39 
“Firms are not in the first stance qualified to judge morality, they are in 
principle only designed to judge what is and is not profitable.”40 Friedman 
(1970) stated that moral is better debated in public forums, not in compa-
nies’ boardrooms. “Firms should maximize returns to shareholders, and 
then allow these shareholders to spend the proceeds on whatever activi-
ties they deem appropriate.”41 However, this does not mean that firms 
should not behave morally. To attract resources efficiently companies 
must not satisfy only their stockholders but also their stakeholders, in oth-
er words, their social environment. Corporate Social Responsibility can 
improve the relationship between the corporation and its environment; 
therefore it can be regarded as an instrument for the procurement of re-
sources. 
                                                 
38 Barnett, Salomon (2003, 382) 
39 See Barnett, Salomon (2003) 
40 Barnett, Salomon (2003, 382) 
41 Barnett, Salomon (2003, 382) 
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In my analysis of stock prices of socially responsible companies during 5 
years between 2002 and 2006, I cannot prove any significant effect on re-
turns of my screened portfolio that could possibly be attributed to a social 
behavior of companies. However, CSR is a long-term strategy and has to 
be analyzed accordingly. This would require a dataset on CSR which goes 
back to the 1950s or 60s, when the term CSR was first used for socially re-
sponsible investing and first screening procedures evolved.  
 
Statman (2005) provides clear evidence for CSR being a long-term finan-
cial driver in his paper on SRI indices. He compares SRI indices to normal 
indices in the United States in a time horizon between 1990 and 2004 and 
finds an outperformance of SRI indices over those 15 years. However, the 
SRI indices do not outperform their benchmarks in every sub-period. In 
the sub period of 2002 to 2006 (the period of time I worked with in this 
thesis) he could not find an outperformance of SRI indices compared to 
traditional indices, for instance. 
 
The arguments to look at CSR as a long-term strategy for companies and 
therefore see it as a performance driver of stock returns in the long-run are 
manifold. According to Heal (2004) CSR can act to improve corporate 
profits and guard against reputational risks. He argues that a socially re-
sponsible behavior can be seen as a hedge against reputational damage 
and therefore as an effective risk-management measure. This argument 
goes into the same direction of Barnett and Salomon (2003), who see CSR 
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as a tool to improve the relationship between the corporation and its social 
environment (its stakeholders). For example, “a firm that builds a reputa-
tion for maintaining a favorable work environment can decrease its hiring 
costs and increase its employee retention rate, decrease community oppo-
sition and legal costs when opening new factories, and may more easily 
lobby for tax breaks from local governments.”42 As a consequence it makes 
much sense to view Corporate Social Responsibility as a long-term goal of 
companies.  
 
In the following section of the thesis I will, nevertheless, look at a screened 
portfolio during a 5 years time horizon, from 2002 to 2006, in order to find 
out if the awareness of investors regarding social responsibility is already 
large enough to observe a positive return effect on stocks of socially re-
sponsible companies in the short run, too. 
                                                 
42 Barnett, Salomon (2003, 382) 
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4 Analysis of stock performance 
4.1 Description of the data 
In order to find out if there is something like a “social premium” in stock 
returns I construct a portfolio with stocks of companies that are doing 
very well in a social responsibility context. Then I compare the stock re-
turns of these companies, corrected for CAPM43 and Fama French factors, 
to the overall index – in my case the S&P 500 – and to a portfolio contain-
ing the least socially responsible companies within the S&P 500. In this 
section of the thesis I will describe the dataset I worked with and the 
screening procedure I used to identify “socially responsible” companies44. 
 
The data that I used to identify socially responsible companies were pro-
vided by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.45 KLD has a database which con-
tains ratings on more than 3000 companies in the US. One of their prod-
ucts is KLD STATS (Statistical Tool for Analyzing Trends in Social and 
Environmental performance), which is a data set with annual snap-shots 
of the environmental, social, and governance performance of companies. 
Each KLD STATS spreadsheet contains identifying company information 
(Name and Ticker), Index Membership and Strength and Concern ratings 
                                                 
43 For a detailed description of CAPM and general investment theory see Bodie et al. 
(2005) 
44 See Anderson, Myers (2006) for a similar screening methodology 
45 KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., 250 Summer street, 4th floor, Boston, Massachusetts 
02210, Website: www.kld.com 
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for multiple indicators within seven qualitative issue areas. These issue 
areas cover approximately 80 indicators in areas including Community, 
Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, 
Human Rights and Product. In addition to this, KLD also provides exclu-
sionary screening information for involvement in the following Contro-
versial Business Issues: Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear 
Power, and Tobacco. The qualitative indicators include both positive and 
negative ratings (strengths and concerns), while the controversial business 
indicators include negative ratings only. For a detailed overview of the 
issue areas and their indicators please refer to Appendix B.46 
 
The data presented in the KLD STATS spreadsheets is a binary summary 
of KLD’s positive and negative ratings. Within each indicator, KLD as-
signs either a 1 for each company which has a strength or a concern in that 
area and a 0 if it doesn’t. Moreover there are exclusionary factors in the 
dataset. A company gets a 1 at the exclusionary factor section, if it is active 
in one of the following controversial business areas: Alcohol, Gambling, 
Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and Tobacco. This exclusion criterion 
constitutes the opportunity to totally exclude certain companies from the 
rating. However, in my scoring I don’t want to exclude these companies, 
as the focus of this work is on sustainable business behavior rather than 
on filtering out “sin stocks” (stocks of companies that do business in con-
troversial business areas47). Therefore the exclusionary categories are only 
                                                 
46 See Hallerbach et al. (2002, 4) and Larson (2003) for similar screening methods. 
47 For the definition and more research on sin stocks see Hong, Kacperczyk (2007) 
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given a negative factor, which is treated like a normal concern in a qualita-
tive business area.  
 
In the spreadsheet I separated the strengths and the concerns and as-
signed them positive and negative factors respectively. Each strength and 
concern category is then assigned a specific weight. Because of the differ-
ent impact of the categories on the sustainability of a companies’ perfor-
mance and to avoid data pooling with many companies getting the same 
score, each category gets its own weight factor. Consequently I assign the 
highest weightings to the categories Corporate Governance and Environ-
ment and the lowest weightings to Diversity48. The weightings for the sev-
en categories are as follows: 
 
Table 1: Weights of KLD scores 
weight of scores 
      
  strength concern 
Community 8% -8% 
Corporate Governance 25% -25% 
Diversity 5% -5% 
Employee Relations 20% -20% 
Environment 22% -22% 
Human rights 12% -12% 
Product 8% -8% 
      
SUM 100%   
                                                 
48 See Appendix B for the detailed explanations of categories 
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After weighting the categories I summed up the strength and the concern 
– ratings of every single company in order to rank them – from the most to 
the least points. To better understand the rating procedure, take a look at 
Table 2, where a simplified example of the procedure is shown. 
 
Table 2: Illustration of the ranking procedure with KLD data 
Company Information Indicators Scoring 
Company Name Ticker C
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Hewlett-Packard Company HPQ 34 13  184 43 141 
International Business       
Machines Corporation 
IBM 29 18  168 56 112 
…        
 
After computing the score for each company I rank it according to its final 
score. 
 
4.1 Positive vs. negative screening procedures 
The objective of this work is to find out if socially responsible companies 
are creating value by operating in a sustainable way (which should be re-
flected in higher than average stock returns). Therefore, at the beginning 
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of my research I aimed at doing a positive screening, which means trying 
to find companies that do extraordinarily well in a social responsibility 
context, instead of excluding companies that do not (negative screening). 
Within the KLD dataset, however, there are positive and negative factors, 
called strengths and concerns. That means that I could combine the two 
scoring procedures and emphasize on positive factors but at the same time 
take into account negative factors (concerns). Moreover I didn’t use the 
“exclusionary” factors as strict indicator to totally exclude certain compa-
nies, just because they are operating in a controversial business area. 
However, after doing the ranking, it can be seen that only one company of 
the TOP portfolio over the years 2002 – 2006 was active in a controversial 
business area and therefore got points subtracted in its final score.49 
 
4.2 Average return comparison 
To get a first idea of how returns vary with their CSR score, I divide the 
whole sample into 10 deciles. Every year from 2002 to 2006 I have return-
data for approximately 500 companies. After ranking them by their CSR 
score I divide all companies into 10 deciles for every single year; the com-
panies with the highest social performance go into decile 1, the ones with 
the worst social performance into decile 10. Each decile therefore contains 
the stocks of approximately 50 companies. Then I look at the average 
weekly return of every decile in each year from 2002 to 2006 and also form 
an overall average of the 5 years of data. According to my hypothesis that 
                                                 
49 Agilent Technologies Inc. for Military Involvement 
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a socially responsible behavior should be reflected in better stock return, 
companies in the first deciles should have a consistently higher stock re-
turns. However, in the below graph one can see that there is no meaning-
ful correlation in the average returns from 2002-2006. However, I argue 
that due to the statistical effect of the returns averaging out over the whole 
time period of 5 years, graph 1 does not convey a meaningful impression. 
 
Graph 1: Average returns by deciles from 2002 - 2006 
 
 
Looking at every single year’s average weekly return by decile (Graph 2), 
one can see that in the first year (2002) the positive correlation between 
social and financial performance is quite strong and even statistically sig-
nificant. In 2003 no link between the social and stock performance can be 
observed in a statistically significant way. However, in the years 2004 to 
2006, the positive relationship is even reversed and gets negative, meaning 
that in the years from 2004 to 2006, socially responsible companies had, on 
average, lower stock returns than their less socially responsible competi-
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tors. The effects of the internet bubble in 2000/2001 can still be observed in 
2002’s returns; therefore all returns in that year are negative. 
Table 3: Average returns by decile (2002-2006) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Overall avg.
1 -12,10% 28,64% 5,18% 0,79% 8,67% 6,24%
2 -8,87% 28,83% 15,25% 0,57% 11,14% 9,38%
3 -25,31% 26,64% 14,52% 10,47% 11,59% 7,58%
4 -12,80% 20,64% 11,14% 5,81% 12,16% 7,39%
5 -30,01% 27,54% 11,58% 6,58% 9,14% 4,96%
6 -39,89% 35,09% 11,98% 5,73% 10,27% 4,63%
7 -16,30% 34,88% 18,46% 7,26% 16,80% 12,22%
8 -28,44% 23,49% 5,11% 4,33% 14,77% 3,85%
9 -22,49% 28,49% 19,49% 8,42% 8,91% 8,57%
10 -34,46% 26,99% 20,08% 11,53% 17,42% 8,31%
de
ci
le
Average returns (p.a.) by decile (2002-2006)
year
 
 
Graph 2: Average returns by deciles by year 
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4.3 Portfolio construction of best vs. worst in class 
After this first impression of the link between social responsibility and 
stock performance I construct a portfolio containing the stocks of 10 com-
panies, which got the highest final score in the ranking. I call this portfolio 
TOP, because it contains the 10 best performing companies in a socially 
responsible sense. By the same logic I construct a portfolio called LEAST, 
containing the 10 worst performing companies in a social responsibility 
context. The described procedure is iterated for every year. The data sup-
plied by KLD contains rating data on S&P 500 companies from 1.1.2002 to 
31.12.2006. Therefore I construct one LEAST and one TOP portfolio every 
year and rebalance my holdings of stocks every end of year. As the rating 
agency rates companies not only on the year’s performance in a social con-
text but rather includes historical data and behavior of the companies on a 
longer period of time the portfolio holdings are not lagged. 
As an example I would invest in a company with a very high KLD rating 
score already at the beginning of 2002, even though the rating procedure 
takes place at different times during the year 2002 for different companies. 
KLD ensures to review its ratings at least once a year; however their rat-
ings on a specific company are not very volatile. If a company gets a high 
score on social responsibility in 2001 it is very likely to get a similarly high 
rating again in 2002. For this reason I use snapshots of KLD rankings at 
the end of each year, starting with 2002 but already invest in the highest 
ranked companies at the beginning of 2002 in order to be able to work 
with a longer return series. This does not distort results, as the portfolio 
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holdings are very constant over time, meaning that over the period of 5 
years, the portfolio composition did not change a lot.50 
The number of companies for which there is data available in the KLD da-
taset is supposed to be 500 every year, as the S&P 500 contains 500 stocks 
at every point in time. However, KLD only rates companies that formed 
part of the index during a whole year. As the composition of the S&P 500 
can change every day and KLD doesn’t take these changes in composition 
into account, it only rates companies that were part of the S&P 500 during 
the whole year. As a result, in the dataset that I work with there is a un-
iverse of less than 500 companies rated every year, whose number also va-
ries slightly over the years. This is the reason why it is necessary to take an 
absolute amount of stocks into my portfolios (in my case 10 stocks) rather 
than the top and bottom percentile of companies. 
 
4.4 Portfolio Performance against the benchmark 
After having constructed two groups of 10 stocks (the best and the least 
performing companies in a social responsibility context) for each year 
from 2002 to 2006 I constructed three portfolios. One portfolio contains 
only the best performing companies of each year, therefore was long in 10 
stocks at every point in time. From here onward I will call it the TOP port-
folio. Another portfolio contains the 10 “least socially performing” com-
panies in every year. Because it is invested in stocks of these most socially 
                                                 
50 See Appendix A for a complete list of TOP and LEAST portfolio holdings from 2002 to 
2006 
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irresponsible companies it is called the LEAST portfolio. Finally I combine 
the two portfolios by holding a long position in the TOP portfolio and a 
short position in the LEAST portfolio, therefore being market-neutral in 
the TOP-LEAST portfolio. However, as the portfolios are only rebalanced 
at the end of each year, the market neutrality only holds for the newly re-
balanced long-short portfolio. 
By comparing the returns of these portfolios with the S&P 500 index, I try 
to find out if the more socially responsible companies were able to earn a 
premium regarding their stock return because of their more sustainable 
way of doing business. Take a look at graph 3 to see how the portfolios 
performed from January 2002 until December 2006. 
 
Graph 3: Performance of the constructed portfolios compared with the 
benchmark index 
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4.5 Fama-French regression of returns 
As one can see from the first impression that graph 3 gives, the strategy of 
going long into socially responsible companies and short into “socially ir-
responsible” ones yielded a great profit in the first two years from 2002 
until the beginning of 2004. With the TOP-LEAST portfolio we observe an 
outperformance of the S&P 500 of up to 40% p.a. in the first year. Howev-
er, this trend reverses sharply in the year 2004 and the gap between the 
TOP and the LEAST portfolio begins to close. After the full time horizon 
of 5 years, the S&P 500 index has outperformed all three portfolios.  
However, an important observation can be made, which will be discussed 
in more detail later: The TOP portfolio outperforms the LEAST portfolio 
consistently nearly over the whole time period until mid 2006.  
Seeing this graph only, one cannot see if there is any significant effect ob-
servable, different from already known factors influencing stock returns 
such as the CAPM beta or Fama French factors51. 
 
In order to test this I run several regressions with the log returns of the 
TOP portfolio, as the TOP-LEAST portfolio is market neutral and it does 
not make any sense to regress its returns on market data. To explain the 
stock returns I first use the classical CAPM factor, therefore only correct-
ing for market beta and taking it as the independent variable in the regres-
sion. As the dependent variable I take the excess returns of my TOP port-
folio over the risk-free rate. I calculate it using the weekly log returns of 
                                                 
51 See Fama, French (1992) 
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the portfolio over 5 years corrected with the risk free rate – taken from 
French’s homepage as well. The risk-free rate used is the US T-bill weekly 
rate that, over four weeks, compounds to the 1-month T-Bill rate from Ib-
botson and Associates, Inc.52 As a result, the first regression equation looks 
like follows: 
 
(1) εβα +−+=− )(* fMfTOP rrrr   
 
For this regression the result is presented in the following table: 
 
Table 4: Result of regression 1 
SUMMARY OUTPUT       
        
Regression Statistics 
    
Multiple R 0,834460321     
R Square 0,696324027     
Adjusted R Square 0,695146988     
Standard Error 0,012036644     
Observations 260     
        
ANOVA       
  df SS MS 
Regression 1 0,085709996 0,085709996 
Residual 258 0,037379245 0,000144881 
Total 259 0,123089241   
        
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept -0,001494992 0,000747849 -1,999054982 
Market beta 0,009635283 0,000396145 24,32261849 
 
                                                 
52 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html; down-
loaded on 03/04/08. 
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Graph 4: Market beta in classical CAPM regression 1 
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Graph 5: Residuals of CAPM regression 1 
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As we can see, variable 1 which I call beta in (1) is highly significant on a 
95% confidence interval and positive. As can be seen graphically in the 
variable 1 fit line plot as well, the beta relationship is quite strong and the 
residuals don’t seem to have much structure. The beta in the regression is 
from weekly returns – therefore if you annualize it you get a beta of 0,501 
to the S&P 500. The intercept (in my regression equation (1) called alpha) 
is also significant on a 95% interval and negative. Getting a significant al-
pha means that the independent variable (in this case only beta) is not 
enough to explain the returns of my TOP portfolio. In this regression the 
alpha is the factor independent return component, comprising all other 
effects that influence the stock return.  
Knowing that the CAPM using only market beta to explain stock returns 
was proven wrong or, more precisely, improved by Fama and French53 
who then introduced two more factors – namely a small firm factor and a 
book-to-market factor – I expand the regression equation (1) with two Fa-
ma/French factors. The stock return of my TOP portfolio is now explained 
by the three independent variables market beta, s and h, as illustrated in 
regression equation (2). Alpha still constitutes the factor independent va-
riable, comprising effects that could be explained with other factors (e.g. a 
more socially responsible behavior). 
 
(2)   εβα +++−+=− HMLhSMBsrrrr fMfTOP **)(*  
 
                                                 
53 Fama, French (1992) 
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Beta represents the market beta as in the former CAPM regression, s is the 
variable for the “small-minus-big” market capitalization and h is the vari-
able for the “high-minus-low” book-to-market value. See Fama, French 
(1992) for a detailed description of the SMB and HML factors. 
 
In order to run regression (2) I download the excess market returns 
)( fM rr − , the SMB and HML factors and the risk-free rate from 2002 to 
2006 from Kenneth French’s homepage. The dependent variable of regres-
sion (2) are the excess returns of my TOP portfolio. The result of the re-
gression is shown below: 
 
Table 5: Result of regression 2 
SUMMARY OUTPUT    
    
Regression Statistics 
  
Multiple R 0,843808598   
R Square 0,712012951   
Adjusted R Square 0,708638102   
Standard Error 0,011767292   
Observations 260   
    
ANOVA    
  df SS MS 
Regression 3 0,087641133 0,029213711 
Residual 256 0,035448107 0,000138469 
Total 259 0,123089241   
    
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept -0,00103413 0,000748995 -1,38068795 
Market beta 0,009067926 0,000416965 21,74743271 
Size 0,000958023 0,000651928 1,469521422 
Book to Market -0,00309039 0,000884982 -3,49203292 
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In this second regression I get a slightly higher R², which means that re-
gressing the returns on three factors is slightly better than relying only on 
market beta. However the R² is still quite low compared to Fama and 
French’s research where they can explain up to 95% of the stock returns 
with three factors. There are probably several reasons for the bad fit. One 
reason is the short period of return series that I run my regression on (only 
5 years). The second reason is the time frame. In 2002, still a lot of distor-
tions from the burst of the internet bubble and the terror attacks on the 
World Trade Center are incorporated into stock returns. Another factor 
could be the weekly data I’m working with, which contains much more 
noise that monthly data, for instance. 
 
Taking a look at the different variables we see that beta (variable 1 in the 
regression table) is positive and highly significant, which is not surprising. 
The very high value of the t-statistic (21,75) can be explained by looking at 
the TOP portfolio holdings: it contains mainly large caps which are highly 
correlated with the S&P500 index. The s (variable 2 in the regression table), 
expressing the small firm effect is positive as well, but only significant on 
the 90% confidence interval. This means that the small size effect during 
this period was not really observable. Variable 3 standing for h, the factor 
explaining the value stock effect is indeed negative and highly significant 
even on the 95% confidence interval. That means that in my sample, value 
stocks tended to underperform growth stocks significantly by a factor of -
0,1607 (annualized). Again, I think that the short period of time for which 
I could test my regression is too short and the noise in the weekly data too 
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strong to get the value-outperformance effect observed by Fama and 
French.54 
 
A quite interesting observation from the regression is the insignificant al-
pha on a 95% confidence interval. As the alpha still constitutes the factor 
independent variable, an alpha significantly different from zero could 
point to the fact that CSR can explain a part of the TOP portfolio returns. If 
I take into account the 90% confidence interval, the alpha becomes signifi-
cant indeed. However, the observed alpha is again negative. The interpre-
tation of this negative alpha is difficult because we do not know which 
other factors could have an influence on the TOP portfolio return. To ana-
lyze in more detail if CSR could be a determining factor to explain stock 
returns I run a Fama-MacBeth regression in chapter 4.6, introducing a 
forth factor into my factor-model from regression (2). This factor is CSR. 
 
Against the argument that the time frame of my analysis is already too 
short because of the lack of more data, I also run the regression of the TOP 
portfolio on the three Fama French factors only over the first two years 
(January 2002 to December 2003). As can be seen in graph 3, the TOP port-
folio clearly outperforms both the index and the LEAST portfolio during 
this time period. As a result one could expect a significant and positive 
alpha running the regression in this time horizon. However, this is not the 
case. Alpha, h and s are all three insignificant during these two years and 
                                                 
54 Fama, French (1992) 
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market beta is the only significant factor able to explain the stock returns. 
This is intuitively easy to understand, as global equity markets rallied 
within the period from 2002 to 2004. 
4.6 Fama-Macbeth regression of returns55 
In order to measure the effect of CSR on the stock returns of my TOP port-
folio and see if CSR can explain a part of the returns, I run another regres-
sion, named after Fama and Macbeth. So far we have only seen that even 
with 3 different factors (Fama-French), the stock returns of the TOP port-
folio could not be fully explained and the alpha is still significant on a 90% 
confidence interval. I now include a 4th factor named CSR, with its corres-
ponding factor loading c and regress each single company’s return on the 
4 factors. Therefore, my regression is of the following form: 
 
(3)  εβα ++++−+=− CSRcHMLhSMBsrrrr fMfi ***)(*  
 
The factors CSR, HML and SMB in this regression are all calculated with a 
mimicking-portfolio, in the case of CSR, subtracting the return of the 10 
worst socially responsible performers from the return of the 10 best CSR-
abiding companies in every year from 2002 - 2006. For the factors HML 
and SMB the book to market value and the market capitalization are used 
respectively. Note an important difference to the last regressions: Now I 
do not only run one regression, namely the TOP portfolio return on the 
                                                 
55 See Fama, Macbeth (1973) 
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different factors, but rather 500 regressions. Each company’s return is re-
gressed on the 4 different factors (market excess return, SMB, HML and 
CSR) and a constant (set to 1). As a result I get 4 factor loadings ( β , s, h, c) 
for each of the 500 companies forming part of the S&P 500. The average 
betas are presented in table 6: 
Table 6: Average factors from regression (3) 
alpha capm b s h c 
Average betas 02 -0,0010 0,9912 0,0196 -0,0048 0,0035 
Average betas 02-03 -0,0007 0,9368 0,0197 -0,0038 0,0033 
Average betas 02-04 -0,0008 0,8937 0,0239 -0,0056 0,0059 
Average betas 02-05 -0,0004 0,8508 0,0243 -0,0053 0,0040 
Average betas 02-06 -0,0005 0,8062 0,0252 -0,0041 0,0075 
 
The alphas are, on average negative, which is not surprising as it was also 
the case in the former regressions. CAPM beta is the only highly signifi-
cant factor in the regression, being close to 1 on average (the market has a 
beta of 1 and the average of 500 companies’ betas is therefore already a 
good proxy for the market portfolio). The average of the other factors (s, h, 
c) is insignificant, however, the average of these factors cannot be inter-
preted in a meaningful way. Therefore, with the factor loadings from re-
gression (3) I run a second regression which has the following form: 
 
(4)  tiitititittti chsR ,,4,3,2,1,0, **** ηγγγβγγ +++++=  
 
For each of the 500 companies I calculated alpha, beta, s, h and c. These 
factor loadings are now regressed on the return of the corresponding 
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company. As a result, regression (4) yields the risk premia ( 4321 ,,, γγγγ ) 
for the 4 factors from regression (3). The annualized risk premia can be 
seen in the table below: 
Table 7: Results of regression (4) 
2002 
risk premium 
(weekly) 
risk premium 
(annualized) 
standard 
error t-statistic 
Delta 1 (capm) -0,0057 -0,2985 0,0045 -1,2727 
Delta 2 (size) -0,0679 -3,5296 0,0465 -1,4599 
Delta 3 (ptbv) -0,0250 -1,2983 0,0307 -0,8144 
Delta 4 (csr) 0,0192 0,9970 0,0348 0,5507 
2002-2003 
risk premium 
(weekly) 
risk premium 
(annualized) 
standard 
error t-statistic 
Delta 1 (capm) -0,0008 -0,0414 0,0048 -0,1651 
Delta 2 (size) -0,0087 -0,4510 0,0625 -0,1388 
Delta 3 (ptbv) 0,0291 1,5129 0,0524 0,5556 
Delta 4 (csr) 0,0281 1,4631 0,0460 0,6115 
2002-2004 
risk premium 
(weekly) 
risk premium 
(annualized) 
standard 
error t-statistic 
Delta 1 (capm) -0,0002 -0,0104 0,0051 -0,0393 
Delta 2 (size) 0,0027 0,1396 0,0664 0,0404 
Delta 3 (ptbv) 0,0268 1,3927 0,0616 0,4346 
Delta 4 (csr) 0,0163 0,8485 0,0509 0,3208 
2002-2005 
risk premium 
(weekly) 
risk premium 
(annualized) 
standard 
error t-statistic 
Delta 1 (capm) -0,0006 -0,0301 0,0053 -0,1083 
Delta 2 (size) 0,0187 0,9734 0,0696 0,2688 
Delta 3 (ptbv) 0,0231 1,2020 0,0673 0,3433 
Delta 4 (csr) 0,0103 0,5349 0,0574 0,1793 
2002-2006 
risk premium 
(weekly) 
risk premium 
(annualized) 
standard 
error t-statistic 
Delta 1 (capm) -0,0005 -0,0279 0,0057 -0,0945 
Delta 2 (size) 0,0193 1,0049 0,0706 0,2737 
Delta 3 (ptbv) 0,0219 1,1369 0,0768 0,2846 
Delta 4 (csr) 0,0066 0,3416 0,0620 0,1060 
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What I observe in the above regression is that none of the risk premia is 
statistically significant. Even on a 90% confidence interval, which has a 
critical value of 1,282, none of the deltas is significant (except from the size 
risk premium in the year 2002). During the tested time period, none of the 
risk factors seem to be statistically significant, which is surprising. 
 
I can therefore neither prove the relevance of a CSR factor when explain-
ing stock returns with the Fama MacBeth method. This result is consistent 
with most of the existing literature on this topic. 
 
4.7 Thoughts on the regression results 
Looking back at the performance chart (graph 3) one can see that the 
LEAST portfolio clearly did not outperform the TOP portfolio. It did in-
deed underperform both the benchmark index and the TOP portfolio 
throughout most of time. A commonly used theory within CSR discus-
sions is that active CSR costs the company money and possibly diminishes 
its productivity. If this would be the case one should clearly see a discount 
in socially responsible corporations’ stock returns because it would mean 
that companies abiding by CSR guidelines are less efficient than others. 
An important point is, that this “cost” of being good cannot be observed 
within my dataset. Again, the time frame is not long enough to give us 
valuable evidence. However, the data suggests that even over a short time 
horizon not being socially responsible as a company does not add value to 
its stock. 
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Addressing the problem of a small time horizon I thought about extend-
ing the return series to earlier years. Holding the same stocks than the 
ones in the TOP portfolio in 2002 already in 2000 would be possible and 
make sense – as the social responsibility of a company doesn’t change 
from one year to another but is rather a long-term strategy for a company. 
Nevertheless the synthetic extension of my TOP portfolio to earlier years 
would be extremely distorted by the burst of the internet bubble in the 
years 2000 and 2001 and the terror attacks on the World Trade Center on 
the 11th September 2001. Taking a look at the TOP portfolio holdings (see 
Appendix A), there are many companies in the IT business such as IBM, 
Intel or Dell. Therefore extending the dataset synthetically to former years 
would not make sense as the distortion of these events on the TOP portfo-
lio return would be large and the gain of data points in the sample not 
valuable. 
An extension of the dataset to the year 2007 is not valuable either because 
of the subprime crisis in the US, triggered by the fall of US house prices. In 
the year 2007 this crisis made equity indices around the world tumble and 
does not make it recommendable to include the year in my analysis, as 
stock prices don’t behave normally during these kinds of crises. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have looked at the social behavior of corporations and how 
it is linked to financial performance and hence reflected in stock prices. 
Companies nowadays seem to think that CSR can possibly pay, as can be 
seen from many CSR initiatives in companies around the globe and the 
emergence of more and more literature on the topic.  
Beginning in the 1950s social responsibility of firms has been discussed 
not only in the boardrooms of large corporations but also in academia. 
Since then, it has always been a very controversial topic and still nowa-
days is regarded as the only way to long-term prosperity by some and a 
terrible way to misspend money by others. Academics and finance profes-
sionals have been trying to resolve these conflicting theories and to find 
some form of common understanding in the last decades. However, there 
is still no definitive answer to the question: Is CSR favorable for a compa-
nies’ financial performance? 
This question can be posed from two different angles. At one hand, CSR 
comes at a certain cost. If you look at the financial performance of a firm in 
a single year, CSR measures will definitely cut some piece out of the firms’ 
profits. Nevertheless, if you extend your horizon to 5 or even 10 or 15 
years, the firm may be better off with CSR than without. The argument for 
this is, that socially responsible behavior reduces risks; from the risk of 
being sued to the risk to lose employees to the risk to get negative press 
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there are many possible “dangers” that can possibly be avoided by the in-
vestment in CSR.56 Moreover, consumer studies have shown that people in 
industrialized economies more and more begin to consider “soft” facts as 
social responsibility when buying everyday consumer goods.  
On the other hand, you could also look at the cost of equity of a company. 
If there are enough investors caring about the social engagement of the 
firms they invest their money in (see Heinkel et al. (2001) – they show that 
this percentage is already at 10% and growing), firms will have to start 
worrying about their financing costs on the equity market. In my opinion 
this development will still pick up speed and will possibly be a threat to 
socially “irresponsible” companies in some years. 
 
As we could see in section 4, there seems to be no significant effect of a so-
cial responsibility screen on stock performance in the short-term yet. As 
pointed out earlier in my thesis, the main problem of statistical insignific-
ance seems to be the short period of time which I got data for. There are 
papers, however, that analyze the stock performance of socially responsi-
ble companies over a longer time horizon. Statman (2005), for instance, 
finds a significant outperformance in SRI funds from 1990 to 2004 and can 
show that the performance of SRI funds depends heavily on the quality of 
their screening procedures. Social responsibility is still very hard to assess 
and to measure – therefore social screens differ a lot in their results. As 
Guerard (1997) and Jennings and Martin (2006) could show, the quality of 
                                                 
56 See Barnett, Salomon (2003, 382) and Heal (2004) 
 53
screens and screens within a socially responsible universe improve the 
performance of social portfolios significantly. As a consequence one can 
conclude that as the quality of screening procedures and the availability of 
those screenings improve, the outperformance of socially responsible 
companies’ stocks will become more visible.  
Future research should therefore focus more on assessing and measuring 
the social engagement of the corporation. Given that academics will find 
new ways to make real corporate citizenship more transparent (instead of 
trusting marketing departments of large companies), the link between so-
cial and financial performance can probably be shown more exactly. 
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Appendix A 
 
Portfolio holdings from 2002 to 2006 (List of companies): 
 
2002 
TOP 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 INTC Intel Corporation 105 
2 LUV Southwest Airlines Co. 78 
3 CINF Cincinnati Financial Corporation 68 
4 NKE NIKE, Inc. 66 
5 APA Apache Corporation 62 
6 XRX Xerox Corporation 58 
7 PG Procter & Gamble Company 58 
8 ITT ITT Industries, Inc. 51 
9 HPQ Hewlett-Packard Company 50 
10 WHR Whirlpool Corporation 50 
WORST 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 CMS CMS Energy Corporation -122 
2 DUK Duke Energy Corporation -125 
3 LMT Lockheed Martin Corporation -126 
4 EP El Paso Corporation -126 
5 WMI Waste Management, Inc. -127 
6 CAT Caterpillar Inc. -133 
7 COP ConocoPhillips -140 
8 XOM Exxon Mobil Corporation -145 
9 OXY Occidental Petroleum Corporation -152 
10 FE FirstEnergy Corporation -169 
2003 
TOP 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 LUV Southwest Airlines Co. 83 
2 INTC Intel Corporation 81 
3 CINF Cincinnati Financial Corporation 73 
4 FNM Fannie Mae 68 
5 NKE NIKE, Inc. 58 
 6 BAX Baxter International, Inc. 54 
7 TXN Texas Instruments Incorporated 48 
8 TLAB Tellabs, Inc. 46 
9 RF Regions Financial Corp 45 
10 MAR Marriott International, Inc. 44 
WORST 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 WMT Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. -115 
2 AEP American Electric Power Company, Inc. -116 
3 CMS CMS Energy Corporation -128 
4 CAG ConAgra Foods, Inc. -129 
5 TYC Tyco International Ltd. -131 
6 XOM Exxon Mobil Corporation -148 
7 COP ConocoPhillips -152 
8 DUK Duke Energy Corporation -165 
9 OXY Occidental Petroleum Corporation -172 
10 FE FirstEnergy Corporation -184 
 
 
2004 
TOP 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 INTC Intel Corporation 129 
2 LUV Southwest Airlines Co. 83 
3 WHR Whirlpool Corporation 68 
4 GE General Electric Company 62 
5 FHN First Horizon National Corporation 61 
6 XRX Xerox Corporation 56 
7 TLAB Tellabs, Inc. 56 
8 BAX Baxter International, Inc. 54 
9 MAR Marriott International, Inc. 52 
10 TXN Texas Instruments Incorporated 48 
WORST 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 HAL Halliburton Company -120 
2 DUK Duke Energy Corporation -125 
3 NEM Newmont Mining Corporation -127 
4 XEL Xcel Energy, Inc. -132 
5 RAI Reynolds American, Inc. -133 
6 TYC Tyco International Ltd. -146 
7 COP ConocoPhillips -152 
8 DYN Dynegy Inc. -161 
9 XOM Exxon Mobil Corporation -162 
10 FE FirstEnergy Corporation -214 
 2005 
TOP 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 INTC Intel Corporation 152 
2 MOT Motorola, Inc. 146 
3 ECL Ecolab Inc. 112 
4 TXN Texas Instruments Incorporated 110 
5 A Agilent Technologies, Inc. 109 
6 EK Eastman Kodak Company 104 
7 LUV Southwest Airlines Co. 103 
8 AMD Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 102 
9 HPQ Hewlett-Packard Company 92 
10 JNJ Johnson & Johnson 89 
WORST 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 XEL Xcel Energy, Inc. -123 
2 BNI Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. -125 
3 ADM Archer-Daniels-Midland Company -130 
4 SHLD Sears Holdings Corporation -135 
5 COP ConocoPhillips -144 
6 TSN Tyson Foods, Inc. -145 
7 AEP American Electric Power Company, Inc. -149 
8 DYN Dynegy Inc. -167 
9 FE FirstEnergy Corporation -191 
10 XOM Exxon Mobil Corporation -195 
 
2006 
TOP 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 A Agilent Technologies, Inc. 159 
2 INTC Intel Corporation 152 
3 HPQ Hewlett-Packard Company 149 
4 MOT Motorola, Inc. 146 
5 AMD Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 129 
6 AMAT Applied Materials, Inc. 124 
7 XRX Xerox Corporation 119 
8 NKE NIKE, Inc. 112 
9 TXN Texas Instruments Incorporated 110 
10 SBUX Starbucks Corporation 102 
WORST 10 
Ticker Name Score 
1 RAI Reynolds American, Inc. -141 
 2 CVX Chevron Corporation -142 
3 SHLD Sears Holdings Corporation -150 
4 COP ConocoPhillips -160 
5 DYN Dynegy Inc. -162 
6 FE FirstEnergy Corporation -169 
7 TSN Tyson Foods, Inc. -170 
8 ADM Archer-Daniels-Midland Company -172 
9 WMT Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. -191 
10 XOM Exxon Mobil Corporation -220 
 
 
  
Appendix B  
KLD STATS dataset description and indicator details57 
 
KLD STATS (STATISTICAL TOOL FOR ANALYZING TRENDS IN 
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE) is a data set 
with annual snap-shots of the environmental, social, and governance 
performance of companies rated by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.  
 
Summary of Data Contained in each Annual KLD STATS spread-
sheet: 
· Identifying Company information (Name, Ticker, CUSIP) 
· Index Membership (DS400, S&P 500, LCS, Russell 1000, BMS, Rus-
sell 2000) 
· Strength and Concern ratings for multiple indicators within seven 
qualitative  issue areas 
· Concerns for six controversial business issues 
· Summary Counts for each of these 13 areas 
 
Strength and Concern Ratings: 
KLD covers approximately 80 indicators in seven major Qualitative 
Issue Areas including Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, 
Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights and Product. In ad-
dition to this, KLD also provides exclusionary screening information 
for involvement in the following Controversial Business Issues: Alco-
hol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and Tobacco. The 
qualitative indicators include both positive and negative ratings 
(strengths and concerns), while the controversial business indicators 
include negative ratings only. 
 
 
                                                 
57 Appendix B – the dataset description and indicator details - is directly copied from 
KLD’s Rating Explanation document. 
  
KLD’s Research: 
The data are gathered through several research processes, which result 
in a full profile of the company’s performance based on Environment, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) factors. KLD’s social research is distri-
buted in SOCRATES - The Corporate Social Ratings database program 
that provides access to KLD’s ratings and other data pertaining to the 
social records of over 3000 publicly traded U.S. companies. 
For more information about KLD’s Research methodology, visit 
www.KLD.com. 
 
Spreadsheet Presentation/Layout: 
The data presented in KLD STATS is a binary summary of KLD’s pos-
itive and negative ratings. In each case, if KLD assigned a rating in a 
particular issue (either positive or negative) KLD indicates this with a 
1 in the corresponding cell. If the company did not have a strength or 
concern in that issue, this is indicated with a 0. The data are separated 
into spreadsheets based on year of data. Each year, KLD freezes its rat-
ings and index membership to reflect the data at calendar year end. 
Each table contains identifying information about the company, index 
membership, a listing of strengths and concerns, involvement in con-
troversial business issues, and total counts for each area. 
 
Each year’s spreadsheet includes all strength, concern, count, and in-
dex membership fields regardless of whether the data were available. 
In the case that a rating was not tracked in a particular year, KLD indi-
cates this with “NR”, meaning “Not Rated.” In the case that the index 
membership was not covered, KLD indicates this with “NA”, meaning 
“Not Available.” For each year’s spreadsheet, there is a separate sheet 
that provides a brief description of the codes located in the column 
headings. The Key also provides any information about ratings that 
KLD has changed, added, deleted, renamed, or moved to another cat-
egory. The following descriptions provide more detailed information 
about these ratings. 
Additionally, at the end of each spreadsheet is a summary count of all 
strengths and concerns the company received in a general category (ei-
ther Qualitative Issue Area or Controversial Business Issue) in that 
year. 
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QUALITATIVE ISSUE AREAS 
 
 
COMMUNITY (COM-) 
 
 
STRENGTHS   
 
Charitable Giving (COM-str-A).  The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three-
year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its 
giving.  In 2002, KLD renamed the Generous Giving Strength as Charitable Giving.   
 
Innovative Giving (COM-str-B).  The company has a notably innovative giving program that 
supports nonprofit organizations, particularly those promoting self-sufficiency among the 
economically disadvantaged.  Companies that permit nontraditional federated charitable giving 
drives in the workplace are often noted in this section as well. 
 
Non-US Charitable Giving (COM-str-F).  The company has made a substantial effort to make 
charitable contributions abroad, as well as in the U.S.  To qualify, a company must make at least 
20% of its giving, or have taken notably innovative initiatives in its giving program, outside the 
U.S. 
 
Support for Housing (COM-str-C).  The company is a prominent participant in public/private 
partnerships that support housing initiatives for the economically disadvantaged, e.g., the 
National Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation. 
 
Support for Education (COM-str-D).  The company has either been notably innovative in its support 
for primary or secondary school education, particularly for those programs that benefit the 
economically disadvantaged, or the company has prominently supported job-training programs 
for youth.  In 1994, KLD added the Support for Education Strength. 
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations (COM-str-E). The company has established relations with indigenous 
peoples in the areas of its proposed or current operations that respect the sovereignty, land, 
culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous peoples.  KLD began assigning 
this strength in 2000.  In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the Human Rights area. 
 
Volunteer Programs (COM-str-G).  The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program.  In 2005, 
KLD added the Volunteer Programs Strength.   
 
Other Strength (COM-str-X).  The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind giving 
program or engages in other notably positive community activities. 
 
 
CONCERNS   
 
Investment Controversies (COM-con-A).  The company is a financial institution whose lending or 
investment practices have led to controversies, particularly ones related to the Community 
Reinvestment Act. 
 
Negative Economic Impact (COM-con-B).  The company’s actions have resulted in major 
controversies concerning its economic impact on the community.  These controversies can 
include issues related to environmental contamination, water rights disputes, plant closings, 
"put-or-pay" contracts with trash incinerators, or other company actions that adversely affect the 
quality of life, tax base, or property values in the community. 
 
 
Copyright ã 2006  by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.   All rights reserved. 
No portion of this material may be reproduced in any form without the express, written permission of the copyright holder.  
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations (COM-con-C).  The company has been involved in serious 
controversies with indigenous peoples that indicate the company has not respected the 
sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples.  KLD 
began assigning this concern in 2000.  In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the Human 
Rights area. 
 
Tax Disputes (COM-con-D).  The company has recently been involved in major tax disputes 
involving Federal, state, local or non-U.S. government authorities, or is involved in controversies 
over its tax obligations to the community.  In 2005, KLD moved Tax Disputes from Corporate 
Governance to Community. 
 
Other Concern (COM-con-X).  The company is involved with a controversy that has mobilized community 
opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy community controversies. 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (CGOV-) 
 
In 2002 KLD renamed the Other category to Corporate Governance in order to better communicate the intent and content of 
these ratings. 
 
STRENGTHS   
 
Limited Compensation (CGOV-str-A).  The company has recently awarded notably low levels of 
compensation to its top management or its board members.  The limit for a rating is total compensation 
of less than $500,000 per year for a CEO or $30,000 per year for outside directors.   
 
Ownership Strength (CGOV-str-C).  The company owns between 20% and 50% of another company KLD 
has cited as having an area of social strength, or is more than 20% owned by a firm that KLD has rated 
as having social strengths.  When a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling 
interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a division of the first. 
 
Transparency Strength (CGOV-str-D).  The company is particularly effective in reporting on a wide range of 
social and environmental performance measures, or is exceptional in reporting on one particular 
measure.  In 2005, KLD added the Transparency Strength, which incorporates information from the 
former Environment: Communications Strength (ENV-str-E) as part of its content. 
 
Political Accountability Strength (CGOV-str-E).  The company has shown markedly responsible leadership 
on public policy issues and/or has an exceptional record of transparency and accountability concerning 
its political involvement in state or federal-level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics.  In 2005, KLD 
added the Political Accountability Strength. 
 
 
Other Strength (CGOV-str-X).  The company has a unique and positive corporate culture, or has undertaken a 
noteworthy initiative not covered by KLD’s other corporate governance ratings. 
 
 
 
CONCERNS   
 
High Compensation (CGOV-con-B).  The company has recently awarded notably high levels of 
compensation to its top management or its board members.  The limit for a rating is total 
compensation of more than $10 million per year for a CEO or $100,000 per year for outside 
directors. 
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Ownership Concern (CGOV-con-F).  The company owns between 20% and 50% of a company 
KLD has cited as having an area of social concern, or is more than 20% owned by a firm KLD 
has rated as having areas of concern.  When a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it 
has a controlling interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a division of the first. 
 
Accounting Concern (CGOV-con-G).  The company is involved in significant accounting-related 
controversies.  In 2005, KLD added the Accounting Concern.  
 
Transparency Concern (CGOV-con-H).  The company is distinctly weak in reporting on a wide 
range of social and environmental performance measures.  In 2005, KLD added the 
Transparency Concern. 
 
Political Accountability Concern (CGOV-con-I).  The company has been involved in noteworthy 
controversies on public policy issues and/or has a very poor record of transparency and 
accountability concerning its political involvement in state or federal-level U.S. politics, or in 
non-U.S. politics.  In 2005, KLD added the Political Accountability Concern. 
 
Other Concern (CGOV-con-X).  The company is involved with a controversy not covered by KLD’s other 
corporate governance ratings. 
 
 
DIVERSITY (DIV-) 
 
STRENGTHS   
 
 
CEO (DIV-str-A).  The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a minority group. 
 
Promotion (DIV-str-B).  The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and 
minorities, particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation. 
 
Board of Directors (DIV-str-C).  Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more 
(with no double counting) on the board of directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the 
board numbers less than 12. 
 
Work/Life Benefits (DIV-str-D).  The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs 
addressing work/life concerns, e.g., childcare, elder care, or flextime.  In 2005, KLD renamed 
this strength from Family Benefits Strength. 
 
Women & Minority Contracting (DIV-str-E).  The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, 
or otherwise has a demonstrably strong record on purchasing or contracting, with women- 
and/or minority-owned businesses. 
 
Employment of the Disabled (DIV-str-F).  The company has implemented innovative hiring 
programs; other innovative human resource programs for the disabled, or otherwise has a 
superior reputation as an employer of the disabled.   
 
Gay & Lesbian Policies (DIV-str-G).  The company has implemented notably progressive policies 
toward its gay and lesbian employees.  In particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners 
of its employees.  In 1995, KLD added the Gay & Lesbian Policies Strength, which was 
originally titled the Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies strength. 
 
Other Strength (DIV-str-X).  The company has made a notable commitment to diversity that is not 
covered by other KLD ratings. 
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CONCERNS 
 
Controversies (DIV-con-A).  The company has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties as a result 
of affirmative action controversies, or has otherwise been involved in major controversies related 
to affirmative action issues. 
 
Non-Representation (DIV-con-B).  The company has no women on its board of directors or among 
its senior line managers. 
 
Other Concern (DIV-con-X).  The company is involved in diversity controversies not covered by other KLD 
ratings. 
 
 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (EMP-) 
 
 
STRENGTHS 
 
Union Relations (EMP-str-A).  The company has taken exceptional steps to treat its unionized 
workforce fairly.  KLD renamed this strength from Strong Union Relations. 
 
No-Layoff Policy (EMP-str-B).  The company has maintained a consistent no-layoff policy.  KLD has 
not assigned strengths for this issue since 1994. 
 
Cash Profit Sharing (EMP-str-C).  The company has a cash profit-sharing program through which it 
has recently made distributions to a majority of its workforce. 
 
Employee Involvement (EMP-str-D).  The company strongly encourages worker involvement 
and/or ownership through stock options available to a majority of its employees; gain sharing, 
stock ownership, sharing of financial information, or participation in management decision-
making. 
 
Retirement Benefits Strength (EMP-str-F).  The company has a notably strong retirement benefits 
program.  KLD renamed this strength from Strong Retirement Benefits. 
 
Health and Safety Strength (EMP-str-G).  The company has strong health and safety programs. 
 
Other Strength (EMP-str-X).  The company has strong employee relations initiatives not covered by other 
KLD ratings. 
 
 
 
CONCERNS 
 
Union Relations (EMP-con-A).  The company has a history of notably poor union relations.  KLD 
renamed this concern from Poor Union Relations. 
 
Health and Safety Concern (EMP-con-B).  The company recently has either paid substantial fines or 
civil penalties for willful violations of employee health and safety standards, or has been 
otherwise involved in major health and safety controversies. 
 
Workforce Reductions (EMP-con-C).  The company has made significant reductions in its workforce 
in recent years. 
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Retirement Benefits Concern (EMP-con-D).  The company has either a substantially under funded 
defined benefit pension plan, or an inadequate retirement benefits program.  In 2004, KLD 
renamed this concern from Pension/Benefits Concern. 
 
Other Concern (EMP-con-X).  The company is involved in an employee relations controversy that is not 
covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENT (ENV-) 
 
 
STRENGTHS   
 
Beneficial Products and Services (ENV-str-A).  The company derives substantial revenues from 
innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote the efficient 
use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental benefits.  (The term 
“environmental service” does not include services with questionable environmental effects, such 
as landfills, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and deep injection wells.) 
 
Pollution Prevention (ENV-str-B).  The company has notably strong pollution prevention programs 
including both emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs.   
 
Recycling (ENV-str-C).  The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials 
in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry. 
 
Clean Energy (ENV-str-D).  The company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on 
climate change and air pollution through use of renewable energy and clean fuels or through 
energy efficiency.  The company has demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly 
policies and practices outside its own operations.  KLD renamed the Alternative Fuels strength 
as Clean Energy Strength. 
 
Communications (ENV-str-E).  The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a 
notably substantive environmental report, or has notably effective internal communications 
systems in place for environmental best practices.  KLD began assigning strengths for this issue 
in 1996, and then incorporated the issue with the Corporate Governance: Transparency rating 
(CGOV-str-D), which was added in 2005. In all spreadsheets it is incorporated into the 
Transparency rating. 
 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (ENV-str-F).  The company maintains its property, plant, and 
equipment with above average environmental performance for its industry.  KLD has not 
assigned strengths for this issue since 1995. 
 
Other Strength (ENV-str-X).  The company has demonstrated a superior commitment to management systems, 
voluntary programs, or other environmentally proactive activities. 
 
 
 
CONCERNS   
 
Hazardous Waste (ENV-con-A).  The company's liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed $50 
million, or the company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for waste 
management violations. 
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Regulatory Problems (ENV-con-B).  The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil 
penalties for violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, or it has a pattern of 
regulatory controversies under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act or other major 
environmental regulations.  
 
Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ENV-con-C).  The company is among the top manufacturers of ozone 
depleting chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl chloroform, methylene chloride, or bromines. 
 
Substantial Emissions (ENV-con-D).  The company's legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as defined 
by and reported to the EPA) from individual plants into the air and water are among the highest 
of the companies followed by KLD. 
 
Agricultural Chemicals (ENV-con-E).  The company is a substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals, i.e., pesticides or chemical fertilizers. 
 
Climate Change (ENV-con-F).  The company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil 
and its derivative fuel products, or the company derives substantial revenues indirectly from the 
combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products.  Such companies include electric 
utilities, transportation companies with fleets of vehicles, auto and truck manufacturers, and 
other transportation equipment companies.  In 1999, KLD added the Climate Change Concern. 
 
Other Concern (ENV-con-X).  The company has been involved in an environmental controversy that is not 
covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS (HUM-) 
 
In 2002 KLD reorganized the presentation of data in the Non-U.S. Operations and Community category.  Ratings in the 
Human Rights area were mostly taken from the former Non-U.S. Operations category.   
 
STRENGTHS   
 
Positive Record in South Africa (HUM-str-A).  The company’s social record in South Africa is 
noteworthy.  KLD assigned strengths in this category in 1994 and 1995. 
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength (HUM-str-D).  The company has established relations with 
indigenous peoples near its proposed or current operations (either in or outside the U.S.) that 
respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous 
peoples.  In 2000, KLD added the Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength. In 2004, KLD moved 
the Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength from Community to Human Rights. 
 
Labor Rights Strength (HUM-str-G).  The company has outstanding transparency on overseas 
sourcing disclosure and monitoring, or has particularly good union relations outside the U.S., or 
has undertaken labor rights-related initiatives that KLD considers outstanding or innovative.  In 
2002, the Labor Rights Strength was added.   
 
Other Strength (HUM-str-X).  The company has undertaken exceptional human rights initiatives, 
including outstanding transparency or disclosure on human rights issues, or has otherwise shown 
industry leadership on human rights issues not covered by other KLD human rights ratings. 
 
 
CONCERNS   
 
South Africa (HUM-con-A).  The company faced controversies over its operations in South Africa.  
KLD assigned concerns for this issue from 1991 to 1994. 
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Northern Ireland (HUM-con-B).  The company has operations in Northern Ireland.  KLD assigned 
concerns for this issue from 1991 to 1994. 
 
Burma Concern (HUM-con-C).  The company has operations or direct investment in, or sourcing 
from, Burma.  KLD started assigning concerns for this issue in 1995. 
 
Mexico (HUM-con-D).  The company's operations in Mexico have had major recent controversies, 
especially those related to the treatment of employees or degradation of the environment.  KLD 
assigned concerns for this issue from 1995 to 2002. 
 
Labor Rights Concern (HUM-con-F).  The company's operations have had major recent 
controversies primarily related to labor standards in its supply chain.  KLD started assigning 
concerns for this issue in 1998, and subsequently renamed it from International Labor Concern.  
KLD subsequently created the Labor Rights Concern using data from the International Labor 
Concern.  KLD started assigning concerns for this issue in 1998. 
Indigenous Peoples Relations Concern (HUM-con-G).  The company has been involved in serious 
controversies with indigenous peoples (either in or outside the U.S.) that indicate the company 
has not respected the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of 
indigenous peoples.  KLD started assigning concerns for this issue in 2000. 
 
Other Concern (HUM-con-X).  The company’s operations have been the subject of major recent 
human rights controversies not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
 
 
PRODUCT (PRO-) 
 
 
STRENGTHS 
 
Quality (PRO-str-A).  The company has a long-term, well-developed, company-wide quality program, 
or it has a quality program recognized as exceptional in U.S. industry. 
 
R&D/Innovation (PRO-str-B).  The company is a leader in its industry for research and development 
(R&D), particularly by bringing notably innovative products to market. 
 
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged (PRO-str-C).  The company has as part of its basic 
mission the provision of products or services for the economically disadvantaged. 
 
Other Strength (PRO-str-X).  The company's products have notable social benefits that are highly unusual or 
unique for its industry. 
 
 
 
CONCERNS 
 
Product Safety (PRO-con-A).  The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties, or is 
involved in major recent controversies or regulatory actions, relating to the safety of its products 
and services.   
 
Marketing/Contracting Concern (PRO-con-D).  The company has recently been involved in major 
marketing or contracting controversies, or has paid substantial fines or civil penalties relating to 
 
 
Copyright ã 2006  by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.   All rights reserved. 
No portion of this material may be reproduced in any form without the express, written permission of the copyright holder.  
advertising practices, consumer fraud, or government contracting. (Formerly: 
Marketing/Contracting Controversy) 
 
Antitrust (PRO-con-E).  The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for antitrust 
violations such as price fixing, collusion, or predatory pricing, or is involved in recent major 
controversies or regulatory actions relating to antitrust allegations.  
 
Other Concern (PRO-con-X).  The company has major controversies with its franchises, is an electric utility 
with nuclear safety problems, defective product issues, or is involved in other product-related 
controversies not covered by other KLD ratings. 
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CONTROVERSIAL BUSINESS ISSUES 
 
KLD's Controversial Business Issues ratings differ from the qualitative ratings described in the above issues: the only type of rating for 
these issues is a concern rating, as they are primarily used as exclusionary lists.  
 
After 2002, KLD listed companies for only one type of involvement in any business issue. Because of this, all types are coded as AREA-
con-A. A few legacy concerns remain and are described below, but are all noted as “not rated” in the spreadsheets post-2002. 
 
ALCOHOL (ALC-con-A) 
 
Licensing.  The company licenses its company or brand name to alcohol products. 
 
Manufacturers.  Companies that are involved in the manufacture alcoholic beverages including beer, distilled 
spirits, or wine. 
 
Manufacturers of Products Necessary for Production of Alcoholic Beverages.  Companies that derive 
15% or more of total revenues from the supply of raw materials and other products necessary for the 
production of alcoholic beverages. 
 
Retailers. Companies that derive 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale or retail) of 
alcoholic beverages. 
 
Ownership by an Alcohol Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company with alcohol 
involvement. 
 
Ownership of an Alcohol Company.  The company owns more than 20% of another company with alcohol 
involvement.  (When a company owns more than 50% of company with alcohol involvement, KLD treats 
the alcohol company as a consolidated subsidiary.) 
 
Alcohol Other Concern (ALC-con-X).  The company derives substantial revenues from the activities closely 
associated with the production of alcoholic beverages.  KLD assigned concerns in this category through 
2002. 
 
 
GAMBLING (GAM-con-A) 
 
Licensing.  The company licenses its company or brand name to gambling products. 
 
Manufacturers.  Companies that produce goods used exclusively for gambling, such as slot machines, roulette 
wheels, or lottery terminals. 
 
Owners and Operators.  Companies that own and/or operate casinos, racetracks, bingo parlors, or other 
betting establishments, including casinos; horse, dog, or other race tracks that permit wagering; lottery 
operations; on-line gambling; pari-mutuel wagering facilities; bingo; Jai-alai; and other sporting events 
that permit wagering. 
 
Supporting Products or Services.  Companies that provide services in casinos that are fundamental to 
gambling operations, such as credit lines, consulting services, or gambling technology and technology 
support. 
 
Ownership by a Gambling Company.  The company is more than 50% owned by a company with gambling 
involvement. 
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Ownership of a Gambling Company.  The company owns more than 20% of another company with 
gambling involvement.  (When a company owns more than 50% of company with gambling involvement, 
KLD treats the gambling company as a consolidated subsidiary.) 
 
Gambling Other Concern (GAM-con-X).  The company derives substantial revenues from the activities 
closely associated with the production of goods and services closely related to the gambling industry or 
lottery industries.  KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002. 
 
 
TOBACCO (TOB-con-A) 
 
Licensing. The company licenses its company name or brand name to tobacco products. 
 
Manufacturers.  The company produces tobacco products, including cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, and 
smokeless tobacco products. 
 
Manufacturers of Products Necessary for Production of Tobacco Products.  The company derives 15% 
or more of total revenues from the production and supply of raw materials and other products necessary 
for the production of tobacco products. 
 
Retailers.  The company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale or retail) of 
tobacco products. 
 
Ownership by a Tobacco Company.  The company is more than 50% owned by a company with tobacco 
involvement. 
 
Ownership of a Tobacco Company.  The company owns more than 20% of another company with tobacco 
involvement.  (When a company owns more than 50% of company with tobacco involvement, KLD 
treats the tobacco company as a consolidated subsidiary.) 
 
Tobacco Other Concern (TOB-con-X).  The company derives substantial revenues from the production of 
tobacco products.  KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002. 
 
FIREARMS (FIR-con-A) 
 
Manufacturers.  The company is engaged in the production of small arms ammunition or firearms, including, 
pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns, or sub-machine guns.  KLD added this coverage in 1999. 
 
Retailers.  The company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale or retail) of 
firearms and small arms ammunition.  KLD added this coverage in 1999. 
 
Ownership by a Firearms Company.  The company is more than 50% owned by a company with firearms 
involvement.  KLD added this coverage in 1999. 
 
Ownership of a Firearms Company.  The company owns more than 20% of another company with firearms 
involvement.  (When a company owns more than 50% of company with firearms involvement, KLD 
treats the firearms company as a consolidated subsidiary.)  KLD added this coverage in 1999. 
 
MILITARY (MIL-con-A) 
 
Manufacturers of Weapons or Weapons Systems.  Companies that derive more than 2% of revenues from 
the sale of conventional weapons or weapons systems, or earned $50 million or more from the sale of 
conventional weapons or weapons systems, or earned $10 million or more from the sale of nuclear 
weapons or weapons systems. 
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Manufacturers of Components for Weapons or Weapons Systems.  Companies that derive more than 
2% of revenues from the sale of customized components for conventional weapons or weapons systems, or 
earned $50 million or more from the sale of customized components for conventional weapons or 
weapons systems, or earned $10 million or more from the sale of customized components for nuclear 
weapons or weapons systems. 
 
Ownership by a Military Company.  The company is more than 50% owned by a company with military 
involvement. 
 
Ownership of a Military Company.  The company owns more than 20% of another company with military 
involvement.  (When a company owns more than 50% of company with military involvement, KLD 
treats the military company as a consolidated subsidiary.) 
 
Minor Weapons Contracting Involvement (MIL-con-B).  The company has minor involvement in 
weapons-related contracting.  In the most recent fiscal year for which information is available, it 
derived $10 to $50 million in conventional weapons-related prime contracts (when that figure is 
less that 2% of revenue), or $1 to $10 million from nuclear weapons-related prime contracts.  
KLD assigned concerns in this category from 1991 through 2002. 
 
Major Weapons-related Supplier (MIL-con-C).  During the last fiscal year, the company received from the 
Department of Defense more than $50 million for fuel or other supplies related to weapons.  KLD 
assigned concerns in this category from 1991 through 2002. 
 
Military Other Concern (MIL-con-X).  The company has substantial involvement in weapons-
related contracting.  In the most recent fiscal year for which information is available, it derived 
more than 2% of sales or $50 million from weapons-related contracting, or it received more than 
$10 million in nuclear weapons-related prime contracts.  KLD assigned concerns in this category 
through 2002. 
 
 
NUCLEAR POWER (NUC-con-A) 
The rating does not include companies that store, dispose, or reprocess nuclear fuel waste nor does it include manufacturers of 
general power plant parts unless the part is specifically and uniquely made for the production of nuclear power. 
 
Construction & Design of Nuclear Power Plants. The company designs, engineers, and constructs nuclear 
power plants and nuclear reactors for use in nuclear power plants; including companies that design 
nuclear reactors and engineer and/or construct nuclear power plants. 
 
Nuclear Power Fuel and Key Parts.  The company supplies nuclear fuel material and key parts used in 
nuclear plants and reactors. Fuel includes mining of uranium and conversion, enrichment, and 
fabrication of uranium. Key parts include manufacture or sale of specialized parts for use in nuclear 
power plants including but not exclusive to steam generators, control rod drive mechanisms, reactor 
vessels, cooling systems, containment structures, fuel assemblies, and digital instrumentation & controls. 
 
Nuclear Power Service Provider.  The company is involved in the transport of nuclear power materials and 
nuclear plant maintenance. 
 
Ownership of Nuclear Power Plants.  The company has an ownership interest or operates nuclear power 
plant(s). Does not include publicly traded companies that are an owner or operator of a nuclear plant that 
has shut down and is being decommissioned. 
 
Ownership by a Nuclear Power Company.  The company is more than 50% owned by a company with 
nuclear power involvement. 
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Ownership of a Nuclear Power Company.  The company owns more than 20% of another company with 
nuclear power involvement. If company ownership of company with nuclear power involvement is 
greater than 50%, KLD treats subsidiary as a consolidated subsidiary. 
 
Design (NUC-con-C).  The company derives identifiable revenues from the design of nuclear power 
plants.  This category does not include companies providing construction or maintenance 
services for nuclear power plants.  KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002; the 
rating was re-instated as Construction & Design of Nuclear Power Plants under the code NUC-con-A 
in 2005. 
 
Fuel Cycle/Key Parts (NUC-con-D).  The company mines, processes, or enriches uranium, or is otherwise 
involved in the nuclear fuel cycle.  Or, the company derives substantial revenues from the sale of key parts 
or equipment for generating power through using nuclear fuels.  KLD assigned concerns in this category 
through 2002. KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002; the rating was re-instated as Nuclear 
Power Fuel and Key Parts under the code NUC-con-A in 2005. 
 
Nuclear Power Other Concern (NUC-con-X).  The company is involved in the production of Nuclear Power.  
KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002. 
  
Abstract (Deutsch) 
 
In dieser Arbeit untersuche ich die Auswirkungen von sozialem Ver-
halten von Unternehmen auf Aktienkurse. Der erste Teil der Diplom-
arbeit enthält eine Literaturzusammenfassung zu diesem Thema. Im 
zweiten Teil der Arbeit untersuche ich Aktienrenditen sozial agieren-
der Unternehmen und vergleiche sie mit Renditen weniger sozialer 
Firmen. Dazu verwende ich Daten der Analystenfirma KLD um durch 
ein soziales Screening des S&P 500 Aktienindex ein CSR-Portfolio zu 
bilden. Über den Zeitraum von 2002 bis 2006 teile ich die Unternehmen 
des Index in Decile und vergleiche zunächst ihre durchschnittliche 
Rendite. Dabei ist weder ein negativer, noch ein positiver Zusammen-
hang zwischen sozialer und finanzieller Performance festzustellen. Da-
rüberhinaus teste ich in mehreren Regressionsanalysen, ob CSR ein 
Rendite-erklärender Faktor sein könnte. Diese These kann ich jedoch 
nicht statistisch signifikant nachweisen. Ich argumentiere jedoch, dass 
Corporate Social Responsibility auf längere Sicht eine Strategie dar-
stellt, die sich positiv auf den finanziellen Erfolg eines Unternehmens 
auswirkt und damit auch dessen Aktienkurse beeinflusst. 
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